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Doing Gloss
Curtis A. Bradley†
It is common for courts, the political branches, and academic commentators
to look to historical governmental practices when interpreting the separation of
powers. There has been relatively little attention, however, to the proper methodology for invoking such “historical gloss.” This Essay contends that, in order to gain
traction on the methodological questions, we need to begin by considering the potential justifications for crediting gloss. For judicial application of gloss, which is
this Essay’s principal focus, there are at least four such justifications: deference to
the constitutional views of nonjudicial actors; limits on judicial capacity; Burkean
consequentialism; and reliance interests. As the Essay explains, these differing justifications have differing methodological implications, and disaggregating them
helps explain variations in the types of evidence that courts have credited in discerning gloss. Perhaps most notably, it helps explain why courts are often less demanding in requiring evidence of institutional acquiescence than commonly recited
standards for gloss would tend to suggest.

INTRODUCTION
In discerning the Constitution’s separation of powers among
the three branches of the federal government, it is common for
courts, the political branches, and academic commentators to
give weight to post-Founding governmental practice. There is
substantial uncertainty, however, about the proper methodology
for determining such “historical gloss.” In order to make progress on the methodological questions, this Essay contends that
it is important to consider the potential justifications for crediting gloss. For judicial application of gloss, which is this Essay’s
principal focus, there are at least four such justifications: deference to the constitutional views of nonjudicial actors; limits on
judicial capacity; Burkean consequentialism; and reliance interests. As the Essay explains, these differing justifications have
differing methodological implications. This Essay considers in
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particular the differing implications that these justifications
have for what constitutes relevant “practice” for purposes of determining gloss, and for the extent to which there must be a
showing of institutional “acquiescence” in the practice. As the
Essay shows, disaggregating the justifications for gloss helps
explain variations in the types of evidence that courts have credited in discerning gloss. Perhaps most notably, it helps explain
why courts are often less demanding in requiring evidence of institutional acquiescence than commonly recited standards for
gloss would tend to suggest.
In recent scholarship and Supreme Court opinions, there has
been increased attention to the relevance of post-Founding governmental practice in discerning the Constitution’s distribution
of authority among the three branches of the federal government,
as well as between the two houses of Congress.1 This approach to
constitutional interpretation can be termed the “historical gloss”
approach, after Justice Felix Frankfurter’s description and defense of it in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v
Sawyer.2 Frankfurter wrote separately in Youngstown to emphasize the interpretive significance of “[d]eeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government,” which he contended could
not “supplant the Constitution or legislation, but [could] give
meaning to the words of a text or supply them.”3 Consistent with
this idea, Frankfurter contended that “a systematic, unbroken,
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress
and never before questioned, . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”4
Although the Supreme Court has invoked gloss in a number
of separation-of-powers decisions, both before and after Youngstown, its most extended consideration of this approach to constitutional interpretation occurred in 2014, in National Labor
Relations Board v Noel Canning.5 In that case, the Court interpreted the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution,
which provides that “[t]he President shall have Power to fill up
1
See, for example, Zivotofsky v Kerry, 135 S Ct 2076, 2091–94 (2015); National
Labor Relations Board v Noel Canning, 134 S Ct 2550, 2559 (2014). See also Curtis A.
Bradley and Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126
Harv L Rev 411, 417–24 (2012) (describing the prevalence of arguments rooted in historical gloss).
2
343 US 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter concurring).
3
Id at 610 (Frankfurter concurring).
4
Id at 610–11 (Frankfurter concurring).
5
134 S Ct 2550 (2014).
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all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate,
by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their
next Session,”6 as allowing the president to make recess appointments during breaks within a yearly session of Congress
and to fill governmental posts that become vacant before the
breaks.7 In doing so, the Court placed “significant weight” on
historical governmental practice relating to appointments.8 The
Court explained that such weight was appropriate because the
relevant constitutional text was ambiguous and “the interpretive questions before us concern the allocation of power between
two elected branches of Government.”9 Reviewing its precedent,
the Court observed that it had “treated practice as an important
interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that
practice is subject to dispute, and even when that practice began
after the founding era.”10 The following year, in Zivotofsky v
Kerry,11 the Court again gave weight to historical governmental
practice in concluding that the president had an exclusive power
to recognize foreign sovereigns and their territories, and in doing so it invoked its analysis from Noel Canning.12
Outside the courts, the gloss approach has long been a
prominent feature of executive branch legal reasoning. To take
just a few examples from the last several decades, executive
branch lawyers have invoked gloss in support of a broad executive authority to conclude binding international agreements
without obtaining the advice and consent of two-thirds of the
Senate;13 a unilateral executive authority to terminate or suspend treaty obligations;14 a presidential power to initiate certain
6

US Const Art II, § 2, cl 3.
Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2567, 2573.
8
Id at 2559 (emphasis omitted).
9
Id.
10 Id at 2560.
11 135 S Ct 2076 (2015).
12 See id at 2091, 2096.
13 See Office of Legal Counsel, Whether Uruguay Round Agreements Required Ratification as a Treaty: Memorandum Opinion for the United States Trade Representative,
18 Op Off Legal Counsel 232, 233 (Nov 22, 1994) (contending that for this issue “a significant guide to the interpretation of the Constitution’s requirements is the practical construction placed on it by the executive and legislative branches acting together”).
14 See John C. Yoo and Robert J. Delahunty, Memorandum for John Bellinger, III,
Senior Associate Counsel to the President and Legal Adviser to the National Security
Council: Authority of the President to Suspend Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty *13
(DOJ, Nov 15, 2001), archived at http://perma.cc/Q6AR-KCBX (“The normative role of
historical practice in constitutional law, and especially with regard to separation of powers, is well settled.”).
7

62

The University of Chicago Law Review

[84:59

military conflicts without congressional authorization;15 and an
exclusive presidential authority to recognize foreign sovereigns
and their territory.16 As these examples illustrate, invocations of
gloss are especially common with respect to matters relating to
US foreign relations, although they are not confined to that subject area. Although less systematically studied, gloss reasoning
has also been common in deliberations and debates within Congress about the separation of powers.17
The effect of gloss is sometimes so strong that it essentially
eliminates constitutional debate. For example, the argument
(associated most notably with Justice Joseph Story18) that the
text of Article III requires that Congress vest the federal courts
with the full extent of the judicial power described in that Article
is a nonstarter in light of the fact that Congress has never done
so.19 Similarly, the Senate’s power to attach reservations to its
advice and consent to treaties is beyond serious question, in
large part because the Senate has engaged in this practice—
without significant objection by the executive branch—for much
of American history.20 Another example of constitutional authority that is now largely taken for granted as a result of longstanding practice is the president’s authority, without seeking

15 See Office of Legal Counsel, Authority to Use Military Force in Libya: Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General *7 (Apr 1, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/B9R5
-L5YN (“This understanding of the President’s constitutional authority reflects not only
the express assignment of powers and responsibilities to the President and Congress in
the Constitution, but also, as noted, the ‘historical gloss’ placed on the Constitution by
two centuries of practice.”).
16 See Brief for the Respondent, Zivotofsky v Kerry, Docket No 13-628, *26 (US filed
Sept 22, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 4924107) (“More than two hundred
years of historical practice confirms what the Constitution’s text and structure make
clear: The recognition power belongs exclusively to the Executive.”).
17 See generally, for example, Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical
Gloss, 92 Tex L Rev 773 (2014) (documenting the use of gloss reasoning in Congress
about the Constitution’s distribution of authority to terminate or suspend treaty obligations); Curtis A. Bradley and Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions,
and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 Georgetown L J 255 (2017) (documenting the
use of gloss reasoning in Congress about whether it has the constitutional authority to
change the size of the Supreme Court and restrict its jurisdiction).
18 See Martin v Hunter’s Lessee, 14 US (1 Wheat) 304, 328 (1816) (Story) (“The
language of [Article III] throughout is manifestly designed to be mandatory upon the
legislature.”).
19 See Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U Pa L Rev
1569, 1585–86 (1990) (noting that the first Judiciary Act did not extend full Article III
jurisdiction to the federal courts).
20 See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U Pa L Rev 399, 404–10 (2000).
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authorization from Congress, to use military force to protect and
rescue Americans endangered abroad.21
Despite the importance and prevalence of the gloss approach to constitutional interpretation, its methodological underpinnings have received relatively little attention. For example, Professor Philip Bobbitt’s influential account of the
“modalities” of constitutional interpretation does not even expressly consider gloss. Although Bobbitt refers to “history” as a
modality, he defines it purely in originalist terms as focused on
the intentions or understandings of the Framers and ratifiers of
the text.22
The methodological issues implicated by the gloss approach
include the following: What counts as relevant “practice”? What
is the required frequency, consistency, and duration of the practice? How does one decide on the proper level of generality at
which to describe the practice? To what extent must there be institutional “acquiescence” or some other understanding of the
practice? And how does gloss relate to other approaches to constitutional interpretation?23 Professor Trevor Morrison and I
considered the role of historical gloss at length in a 2012 article,
Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers,24 and some of
what is discussed here draws from that article. Nevertheless,
our central focus in that article was demonstrating how modern
congressional-executive relations complicate efforts to rely on
governmental practice when interpreting the separation of powers,25 and we generally avoided taking a position on the proper
methodology for “doing gloss.”
This Essay contends that, in order to gain traction on the
methodological questions, it is important first to consider the
potential justifications for relying on historical practice when
discerning the separation of powers. As this Essay shows, different
21 See Curtis A. Bradley and Jean Galbraith, Presidential War Powers as an Interactive Dynamic: International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based Legal Change, 91
NYU L Rev 689, 713–18 (2016).
22 See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation 12 (Basil Blackwell 1991) (describing the historical modality as “relying on the intentions of the framers and ratifiers
of the Constitution”); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 9
(Oxford 1982) (“Historical arguments depend on a determination of the original understanding of the constitutional provision to be construed.”).
23 See Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 Harv L Rev F 75, 77–79 (2013).
24 See generally Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev 411 (cited in note 1).
25 See id at 448 (arguing that the “descriptive shortcomings” of James Madison’s
ideas about the separation of powers “carry several significant implications for relying on
ideas of institutional acquiescence to resolve separation of powers controversies”).
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potential justifications for gloss have differing methodological
implications. This disaggregation of justifications helps explain
variations in the types of evidence that courts have credited in
discerning gloss. Perhaps most notably, it helps explain why
courts are often less demanding in requiring evidence of institutional acquiescence than commonly recited standards for gloss
would suggest.
I. POTENTIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CREDITING GLOSS
Any consideration of how to “do” an approach to law is inevitably intertwined with normative questions about the value of
the approach, and that is true of the gloss approach to constitutional interpretation. This is not the place for a full normative
evaluation of gloss, which would require not only an account of
its potential benefits but also an assessment of its potential
drawbacks. Nor does this Essay attempt to situate gloss more
generally within constitutional theory, something that has been
explored in other writings.26 Instead, the aim here is simply to
describe the most likely justifications for crediting gloss in discerning the separation of powers, particularly in judicial decisions.27 A review of Supreme Court decisions and other materials
that have invoked gloss suggests that there are at least four such
justifications: deference to nonjudicial actors; limits on judicial
capacity; Burkean consequentialism; and reliance interests. As
will become apparent, probably the two most important, in terms
of offering the most distinct visions about how to do gloss, are the
deference justification and Burkean consequentialism.28
A.

Deference to Nonjudicial Actors

The deference justification rests on the proposition that the
courts do not have a monopoly on constitutional interpretation.
Other governmental actors are sworn to uphold the Constitution,
26

See, for example, Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 424–28 (cited in note 1).
Although historical practice is potentially relevant to judicial decision-making in
other areas of constitutional law, such as federalism and individual rights, those areas
raise sufficiently distinct issues that they are not addressed here. In addition, this Essay
is focused only on the relevance of the historical practices of governmental institutions
and not on the relevance of other nonoriginalist history to constitutional analysis.
28 The justifications for executive branch or congressional invocation of gloss may
differ to some extent from the justifications for judicial invocation of gloss, and these potential differences are not explored here. For a discussion of some reasons why the executive branch relies on gloss, see Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 457–61 (cited
in note 1).
27
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and they must of necessity interpret it as part of their duties.29
Moreover, with respect to separation-of-powers issues, political
branch actors are likely to have a better understanding than
courts of the practical consequences of particular constitutional
interpretations. Furthermore, judicial deference to political
branch understandings can reduce countermajoritarian concerns
associated with constitutional judicial review, concerns that are
especially strong when both political branches share a view that
is different from the judiciary’s view, and have held that view for
a long time. Giving weight to such views, this argument suggests, can be a way of making constitutional interpretation more
democratically legitimate. For these reasons, this justification
suggests that if the political branches have coalesced around a
constitutional interpretation, and that understanding has persisted, it merits judicial deference.30
B.

Limits on Judicial Capacity

A related justification for gloss concerns limits on judicial
capacity. Sometimes courts invoke practice because other constitutional materials are perceived to offer insufficient guidance.31
This may be especially likely with respect to questions of executive power, given the limited textual guidance in Article II of the
Constitution as well as substantial changes in the nature of the
presidential office and international affairs over time.32 For such
issues, unless the courts abstain altogether, relying on practice
may offer the best option for a reasoned disposition of the case
that seeks to avoid appealing simply to a policy assessment or
“choosing a side” in a dispute between the branches. This justification for looking to gloss is consistent with the concept of
29 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-judicial Precedent, 61 Vand L Rev 713, 746 (2008)
(“[V]irtually every question of constitutional law that the Court hears already has been
considered by one or more non-judicial actors.”).
30 For illustrations of this attitude in practice, see, for example, Zivotofsky, 135 S
Ct at 2094 (“The weight of historical evidence indicates Congress has accepted that the
power to recognize foreign states and governments and their territorial bounds is exclusive to the Presidency.”); Dames & Moore v Regan, 453 US 654, 680 (1981) (“Crucial to
our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of
claim settlement by executive agreement.”).
31 See, for example, Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2594 (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (agreeing, while expressing reservations about practice-based arguments, that an
“ambiguous constitutional provision” is ripe for historical analysis) (emphasis added).
32 See Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 417–18 (cited in note 1) (noting
that Article II’s general language has given rise to a reliance on practice-based arguments concerning the scope of presidential powers).
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“constitutional construction” articulated by some theorists,
which envisions that interpreters can draw on various materials
to resolve constitutional meaning “when the Constitution as
written cannot in good faith be said to provide a determinate answer to a given question.”33
C.

Burkean Consequentialism

The Burkean consequentialist justification rests on the
premise that long-standing practices are suggestive of what
works well, or at least what works better than anything the
courts are likely to impose.34 These practices reflect the judgments of many actors over time, informed by the realities of governance and changes in the needs of governance, and therefore,
the reasoning goes, they have the potential to embody collective
wisdom. Under this rationale, the very persistence of a practice
is evidence of its utility.35 In Noel Canning, for example, the
Court claimed that the frequent and long-standing use of recess
appointments “suggests that the Senate and President have recognized that recess appointments can be both necessary and appropriate in certain circumstances.”36
Burkean consequentialism also recognizes that longstanding practices are likely to be embedded within a broader
array of understandings and institutional behavior, such that
undoing them carries a risk of unforeseen consequences, including social and institutional disruption.37 That is, even if one is
uncertain about the extent to which a particular practice is
33 Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 Const
Commen 119, 120–21 (2010). See also Lawrence B. Solum, The InterpretationConstruction Distinction, 27 Const Commen 95, 96 (2010).
34 See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich L Rev 353, 359 (2006)
(“The argument for Burkeanism is that respect for traditions is likely to produce better
results, all things considered, than reliance on theories of one or another kind, especially
when those theories are deployed by such fallible human beings as judges.”).
35 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi L
Rev 877, 891–92 (1996) (noting that traditions “reflect a kind of rough empiricism: . . .
they have been tested over time, in a variety of circumstances, and have been found to be
at least good enough”).
36 Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2560.
37 See Mitchell Pearsall Reich, Incomplete Designs, 94 Tex L Rev 807, 831 (2016):

A Burkean-minded judge deciding whether to upset a settled interpretation of
a clause cannot contend just with history’s judgment that the interpretation of
the clause itself is correct. She must also recognize history’s judgment that
numerous institutional decisions that likely surround it—and which the judge
may be unable to identify, let alone evaluate—are useful, workable, and correct
as well.

2017]

Doing Gloss

67

optimal, the risks associated with unsettling the practice may
outweigh any potential benefits that would be achieved. This
idea, too, appears in the reasoning in Noel Canning. In explaining why it should not overturn long-standing practice relating to
recess appointments, the Court observed: “We have not previously interpreted the Clause, and, when doing so for the first
time in more than 200 years, we must hesitate to upset the compromises and working arrangements that the elected branches
of Government themselves have reached.”38
D. Reliance Interests
A related justification, which concerns a particular type of
consequentialist consideration, is one based on reliance interests. This idea, similar to one of the justifications for stare decisis,39 is that over time both governmental actors and third parties (including, potentially, society at large) are likely to have
adjusted their behavior to account for persistent practices, and
that they may have made decisions and concessions based on
this reliance. The more long-standing and entrenched the practice becomes, the more likely it is that the practice will have
such reliance effects. This justification can also be found in Noel
Canning, most notably in the Court’s observation that it was
“reluctant to upset this traditional practice where doing so
would seriously shrink the authority that Presidents have believed existed and have exercised for so long.”40
***
In thinking about these potential justifications for crediting
historical gloss, three additional points should be kept in mind.
First, although these justifications are analytically distinct, they
overlap and are potentially mutually reinforcing. For example,
limits on judicial capacity can be a justification for deference to
political branch interpretation, and also for the risk aversion
38 Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2560. See also generally Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated
Structural Constitution, 114 Colum L Rev 1595 (2014) (offering a descriptive and normative account of bargains between governmental institutions concerning their authority).
39 See generally Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 Wash & Lee
L Rev 411 (2010).
40 Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2573. See also United States v Midwest Oil Co, 236 US
459, 472–73 (1915) (noting that “officers, law-makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any long-continued action of the Executive Department—on the presumption
that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice”).
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associated with Burkean consequentialism. Moreover, the justifications are not mutually exclusive: it would not be inconsistent
for an interpreter to invoke more than one justification—or even
all of them—to justify resort to gloss. Nevertheless, as discussed
below, it is possible to perceive differences in emphasis between
the justifications offered by interpreters, in particular a difference in emphasis between justifications centered on deference
and justifications centered on Burkean consequentialism.
Second, most if not all of the justifications assume that some
amount of pragmatic reasoning is relevant to constitutional interpretation in the separation-of-powers area. As the Supreme
Court explained (in somewhat-dated language) when relying on
past governmental practice in United States v Midwest Oil Co,41
“government is a practical affair intended for practical men.”42
The more that one conceives of constitutional interpretation as a
formal enterprise, involving merely the application of objectively
identifiable textual meaning or original understanding, the less
one will perceive the various justifications for gloss to be relevant. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Supreme Court decision
best known for declining to credit gloss, Immigration and
Naturalization Service v Chadha,43 is highly formal in its reasoning.44 Nevertheless, it should be noted that even Supreme
Court justices known for their commitment to constitutional
formalism have accepted the potential relevance of gloss under
some circumstances.45
Third, another factor that is likely to affect the relevance of
the above justifications for crediting gloss is the frequency of judicial review. Gloss argumentation thrives most when there is
an absence of frequent judicial intervention, which is one reason
it has been so common in the area of foreign affairs.46 When
41

236 US 459 (1915).
Id at 472.
43 462 US 919 (1983).
44 See id at 945 (“[P]olicy arguments supporting even useful ‘political inventions’
are subject to the demands of the Constitution which defines powers and, with respect to
this subject, sets out just how those powers are to be exercised.”).
45 See, for example, Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2594 (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (“Of course, where a governmental practice has been open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early days of the Republic, the practice should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional provision.”); Stern v Marshall, 564 US 462, 504–05
(2011) (Scalia concurring) (“[A]n Article III judge is required in all federal adjudications,
unless there is a firmly established historical practice to the contrary.”) (second emphasis
added).
46 See Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 429 (cited in note 1).
42
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engaging in constitutional reasoning, courts are more likely to
focus on their own precedent and reasoning rather than on nonjudicial practices, so extensive judicial interventions will tend to
displace judicial reliance on gloss. Moreover, because of the tradition of judicial supremacy, political branch actors will typically
coordinate around judicial decisions,47 so such decisions are likely
to disrupt the ongoing development of practice. As a result, it is
less likely in that situation that practices will become longstanding before they are challenged, and also less likely that
they will generate reliance interests.48
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOSS METHODOLOGY
These differing justifications for gloss have differing implications for methodological questions concerning how to “do”
gloss. This Part analyzes two such questions: what should count
as “practice” when discerning gloss and whether a showing of institutional acquiescence should be required in order to establish
gloss.
A.

What Counts as “Practice”?

The historical gloss approach takes account of postFounding governmental practice in discerning the separation of
powers. But what precisely constitutes the “practice” of governmental institutions? Presumably it includes the enactment of
statutes, which is the most obvious way in which Congress as an
institution takes action. In United States v Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp,49 for example, the Court gave weight to the fact that Congress had long enacted statutes giving broad foreign affairs authority to the president to support its conclusion that the delegation of criminalization authority in that case did not violate the
separation of powers.50 Similarly, governmental practice also
presumably includes presidential actions intended to have binding
47 See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court,
115 Harv L Rev 4, 5–7 (2001) (describing the historical evolution of judicial supremacy
and noting that modern politicians assume judicial supremacy “as a matter of course”).
48 Some of the tensions between judicial review and gloss can be eased by judicial
“minimalism”—that is, “narrow, incompletely theorized rulings.” Sunstein, 105 Mich L
Rev at 408 (cited in note 34).
49 299 US 304 (1936).
50 See id at 329 (“The uniform, long-continued and undisputed legislative practice
just disclosed rests upon an admissible view of the Constitution which, even if the practice
found far less support in principle than we think it does, we should not feel at liberty at
this late day to disturb.”).
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effect—for example, a directive that US troops engage in combat, the conclusion of an executive agreement, the appointment
of officials during a Senate recess, or a declaration that the
United States recognizes a particular foreign government.
There are a variety of additional congressional and executive branch materials, however, that take positions on separationof-powers matters. For Congress, these materials include committee reports and nonbinding Senate and House resolutions.
For the executive branch, they include legal memoranda (such
as from the Office of Legal Counsel) and presidential signing
statements. It is common for invocations of gloss to cite such
materials,51 but there has been little express consideration of
why they are relevant. If gloss concerns the iterative behavior of
governmental institutions, one might think that the only relevant consideration is their actual behavior, not their verbal
claims about their (or the other branches’) authority.52
The differing justifications for gloss yield potentially different answers. Because the deference justification is focused on
the views of the political branches, it presumably would treat as
relevant their articulations of those views, even if not accompanied by action. Indeed, their expression of constitutional views
might be even more relevant than their actual behavior under
this justification. Institutional behavior, after all, might be occurring for a variety of reasons other than a particular understanding of the Constitution.53 What is most important for deference is that the political branches, staffed by officials sworn to
uphold the Constitution, have considered the issue and endorsed
a particular constitutional interpretation.
There is, of course, an inherent danger of “cheap talk” when
statements about the law are not accompanied by action. This
danger, however, merely suggests that such statements should be
considered with caution, not that they are irrelevant. Moreover,
there might be evidence of the costliness of the statements even
in the absence of practice—for example, if the statements are
51 See, for example, Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2562–64 (examining numerous reports and opinions from both the legislative and executive branches to ascertain the
branches’ historical views concerning the Recess Appointments Clause).
52 See Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers
Disputes, 64 BU L Rev 109, 134 (1984) (contending that “mere assertions of authority to
act are insufficient”).
53 See Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 Geo Wash L Rev 668, 684–
87 (2016) (describing how “a branch might act (let alone, not act) for many reasons not
primarily motivated by constitutional analysis”).
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contrary to short-term political interests. It is also worth keeping
in mind that, in some instances, expressions of views about the
separation of powers that are made in the abstract are likely to be
less opportunistic than ones made in the midst of controversy.
A wide range of materials could be relevant to discerning
the constitutional understandings of the political branches. Even
statements by individual members of Congress would potentially
be relevant. Although such statements would not by themselves
tell us the understanding of Congress as a whole (or even of a
house of Congress or one of its committees), they could help reveal which constitutional propositions were generally taken for
granted and which were disputed. Just as with resort to legislative history for interpreting statutes (which, although controversial, is commonplace), more weight should presumably be given
to committee reports than to statements by individual legislators. Even greater weight could be given to congressional resolutions voted on by one or both houses of Congress—that is, to
congressional “soft law.”54
As for the executive branch, greater weight could be given to
internal legal reasoning (which later becomes public) than to
public argumentation (such as that in signing statements), because the former would presumably reflect a more candid expression of views. And, again, expressions of constitutional
views that are contrary to apparent political interests may be
especially telling.
Another reason for looking to expressions of views by governmental officials stems from concerns about judicial capacity:
it is difficult to know how to describe practice for purposes of
making claims about gloss without considering how that practice is understood by its participants. As with all appeals to custom (and to judicial precedent55), there will inevitably be a question about the appropriate level of generality at which to
describe the past practice, something that the practice itself cannot resolve. To help resolve this issue, it can be useful to look to
how participants in the practice understand its generalizability,
which requires looking to the claims they make about gloss and
not just to their practice.
54 Jacob E. Gersen and Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 Stan L Rev 573, 603 (2008) (noting that nonbinding congressional resolutions
and other forms of “soft law” are “better indicator[s] of legislative views than legislative
inaction”).
55 See generally Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 Mich L Rev 179 (2014).
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Nevertheless, some of the other justifications for gloss would
place more weight on the actual behavior of institutions than on
their stated views. For example, Burkean consequentialism
treats as presumptively valid long-standing patterns of governmental conduct, but the same rationale would not necessarily
apply to mere long-standing claims about the Constitution unsupported by conduct.56 The reliance justification falls somewhere in between: actual behavior is more concrete evidence
that there has been reliance, but it is still possible that there
will have been reliance, or institutional bargains, based on
statements about the law.
If one is focused on institutional behavior, there is still a
question of what constitutes behavior. In particular, there is a
question about whether institutional inaction is a type of behavior. In theory, inaction could be relevant both for justifications
focused on constitutional understandings and for justifications
focused on patterns of behavior, although for different reasons.
Inaction in the face of action by another branch might be evidence of agreement with the constitutionality of that action, especially if there would otherwise be political incentives to contest the legality of the action. Similarly, if a branch considers
acting and then refrains from doing so after legal claims are
made against it, its inaction might suggest agreement with the
claims. The Supreme Court relied on this sort of evidence in
Zivotofsky, in support of an exclusive presidential power to recognize foreign sovereigns and their territory.57
Of course, there will often be potential explanations for inaction other than constitutional agreement, such as political calculation, institutional paralysis, or inattention, so this sort of evidence must be examined carefully.58 An institution’s failure to
raise a constitutional objection to another branch’s practice
should be given more weight when the institution is actively focused on the practice—for example, when it is opposing instances
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See Sunstein, 105 Mich L Rev at 356 (cited in note 34).
See Zivotofsky, 135 S Ct at 2092 (emphasizing that Congress had refrained from
recognizing the independence of Spanish colonies in South America in the early nineteenth century in the face of constitutional arguments that the recognition power rested
exclusively with the president).
58 Because of Congress’s collective action and partisan limitations, it will often be
difficult for it to oppose executive action through the formal act of passing legislation. As
a result, it can be problematic to treat Congress’s failure to enact legislation as “inaction,” especially when Congress has engaged in other measures designed to express opposition. See Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 446, 451–52 (cited in note 1).
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of the practice on policy grounds or is otherwise regulating in
the area. Thus, in Noel Canning, the Court emphasized that
even when the Senate was addressing issues relating to recess
appointments in the twentieth century, it had not argued that it
was unconstitutional for the president to make recess appointments during intrasession breaks or for vacancies that occurred
prior to the break.59
Even when inaction does not show constitutional agreement, however, it could still show a pattern of institutional behavior and thus potentially be relevant to justifications that are
not focused as much on shared constitutional understandings.
In particular, inaction in the face of long-standing practice by
another branch might confirm that the practice is stable or entrenched. This might help explain why the Court in Zivotofsky
treated as relevant the lack of congressional regulation of recognition throughout much of the twentieth century without attempting to establish that this inaction was the result of a perception by Congress that it lacked authority to regulate.60
In evaluating the weight to be given to either expressions of
constitutional views or behavior, another complication is that of
party affiliation.61 A significant limitation on the idea that the
political branches will act to safeguard their institutional interests—an idea associated most famously with James Madison’s
Federalist 5162—is the commitment of governmental actors to
their political party. This means, for example, that a Congress
controlled by the president’s political party is less likely to resist
presidential incursions on congressional authority than one controlled, in whole or in part, by the opposition party.63 Congressional inaction in the face of presidential assertions of authority,
therefore, is more probative when it occurs during periods of divided government, regardless of whether one is looking for common constitutional understandings or entrenched institutional

59

See Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2563–64, 2572–73.
See Zivotofsky, 135 S Ct at 2093–94.
61 See generally Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties,
Not Powers, 119 Harv L Rev 2311 (2006).
62 See Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 349 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob
E. Cooke, ed) (arguing that “the great security” of separation of powers “consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and
personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others”).
63 See Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv L Rev at 2324 (cited in note 61) (observing
that “the political interests of elected officials generally correlate more strongly with party
than with branch”).
60
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practice. Conversely, congressional opposition is more probative
when it comes from the president’s own party.
Whether focused on views or behavior, there is no precise
metric for how long the practice must have persisted before being given weight as gloss. The deference justification would presumably require the least amount of time, given that the political branches could reach a common understanding about the
Constitution in a relatively short period. Some of the other justifications, such as Burkean consequentialism and reliance interests, are, by contrast, likely to be focused on long-term accretions of practice. In Noel Canning, in which the Court was
concerned about “upset[ting] the compromises and working arrangements that the elected branches of Government themselves have reached”64 and about “seriously shrink[ing] the authority that Presidents have believed existed and have exercised
for so long,”65 the Court observed that “three-quarters of a century
of settled practice is long enough to entitle a practice to ‘great
weight in a proper interpretation’ of the constitutional provision.”66
In sum, determining what should properly count as “practice” depends in part on the justifications for gloss. In particular,
justifications grounded in deference to political branch understandings are likely to credit a wide range of materials, including “soft law” materials, that help reveal such understandings.
By contrast, Burkean justifications and justifications grounded
in judicial capacity are likely to emphasize long-standing patterns of government action and inaction, even when it is not clear
that the patterns are the result of constitutional understandings.
B.

Must There Be Institutional “Acquiescence” in the Practice?

The Supreme Court has suggested in a number of decisions
that, in order to establish gloss, it must be shown that the affected branch has “acquiesced” in the practice in question, and
this is what Justice Frankfurter claimed in Youngstown.67 This
claim is also common in academic commentary about gloss.68 The
64

Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2560.
Id at 2573.
66 Id at 2564.
67 See Youngstown, 343 US at 613 (Frankfurter concurring) (accepting that the
“long-continued acquiescence of Congress” can “giv[e] decisive weight to a construction
by the Executive of its powers”).
68 See, for example, David J. Bederman, Custom as a Source of Law 111 (Cambridge
2010) (noting that for historical practice to inform interpretation of the separation of
powers, one must ask “whether the opposing branch in the separation-of-powers struggle
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executive branch has been less committed to this proposition,
sometimes contending that long-standing executive branch practice made under claim of right is sufficient to establish gloss.69
As with what counts as “practice,” whether acquiescence
should be required, and the evidence that would be needed to establish it, will depend on the justifications for relying on gloss.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the idea of acquiescence could encompass a variety of interbranch relations. It
could mean express agreement between the branches about a
proposition of constitutional law.70 Or it could involve agreement
about operational feasibility and desirability, as opposed to legality in a formal sense. Or it could mean simply a failure by one
branch to resist claims of constitutional authority by another
branch, for whatever reason.
The justification that most closely depends on a showing of
acquiescence is the deference justification. If the claim is that
the two political branches have long had a shared understanding
of the separation of powers, the claim will require an especially
strong form of acquiescence: actual interbranch agreement about
the law. Mere long-standing practice and lack of resistance by
another branch will not be sufficient.71
Importantly, though, even some variants of the deference
rationale might not depend on a clear showing of acquiescence.
In particular, if one branch has long articulated a constitutional
view about the separation of powers and the other branch has
been silent, it may not be clear whether there is any agreement
between the branches. Nevertheless, the views of the branch
that has maintained the position may still be entitled to some
deference, especially if these views have been consistent and
have reflected the views of both major political parties.72 After

has actually accepted or ‘acquiesced’ in the practice”); Glennon, 64 BU L Rev at 134 (cited
in note 52) (contending that the affected branch “must have acquiesced in the custom”).
69 See Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 459–60 (cited in note 1).
70 See, for example, Michael J. Glennon, The Cost of “Empty Words”: A Comment on
the Justice Department’s Libya Opinion *3 (Harvard National Security Journal 2011),
archived at http://perma.cc/VA76-E2Y3 (contending that, although “practice can affect
the Constitution’s meaning and allocation of power,” “[a] practice of constitutional dimension must be regarded by both political branches as a juridical norm” before it does so).
71 For one articulation of this position, see Roisman, 84 Geo Wash L Rev at 710
(cited in note 53) (proposing that the only historical practice that should be credited is
that which “is likely to be indicative of constitutional agreement between the branches”).
72 See Bradley and Morrison, 126 Harv L Rev at 460 (cited in note 1). See also, for
example, Office of Legal Counsel, Authority to Use Military Force in Libya at *7 (cited in
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all, as Frankfurter observed in Youngstown, long-standing executive practice is “engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn
to uphold the Constitution.”73 Similarly, in Noel Canning, the
Supreme Court gave weight to the fact that “the publicly available opinions of Presidential legal advisers that we have found
are nearly unanimous in determining that the [Recess Appointments] Clause authorizes” appointments during intrasession
breaks.74
Moreover, even if it requires a showing of acquiescence, the
deference justification would not necessarily require interbranch
agreement about the constitutional text. Instead, it could be
premised on the idea that part of constitutional reasoning is
pragmatic (such as structural reasoning, as well as of course
consequentialist reasoning), and that the political branches will
have a better understanding than courts do of the operational
feasibility and desirability of particular separation-of-powers arrangements. This idea seems to be reflected in the suggestion
that is sometimes made by the Supreme Court and executive
branch lawyers that gloss entails a “practical construction” of
the Constitution.75 The more that we accept that constitutional
interpretation involves an exercise in pragmatic judgment, the
less we will require that the nonjudicial actors have formulated
understandings about the text or original understanding of the
Constitution, as opposed to what works well.
The other justifications for gloss have an even weaker connection to any requirement of acquiescence. For example,
Burkean consequentialism might support looking to historical
practice even in the absence of any evidence of acquiescence because of its focus on the value of established ways of doing
things and a concern about the risks of change.76 Similarly, limits on judicial capacity might suggest deferring to practice even
if it does not clearly reflect a common understanding of the political

note 15) (stressing that the war powers practice not only “extended over many decades”
but was also “engaged in by Presidents of both parties”).
73 Youngstown, 343 US at 610 (Frankfurter concurring).
74 Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2562.
75 See, for example, The Pocket Veto Case, 279 US 655, 675 (1929); Field v Clark,
143 US 649, 691 (1892); 18 Op Off Legal Counsel at 233 (cited in note 13).
76 See Ernest A. Young, Our Prescriptive Judicial Power: Constitutive and Entrenchment Effects of Historical Practice in Federal Courts Law, 58 Wm & Mary L Rev
535, 557–58 (2016) (contending that Burkean justifications for crediting historical practice do not require a showing of institutional acquiescence).
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branches, because the practice can still provide a type of precedent external to a court’s preferences.
Once again, the reliance justification is uncertain: it is possible to imagine reliance occurring even in the absence of acquiescence, but it is also possible to insist that such reliance be
“reasonable” before it will be credited, which may simply take us
back to the initial question whether acquiescence is required in
order for gloss to be credited. That said, disrupting even unreasonable reliance can pose concerns about institutional and social upheaval and unintended consequences of the sort that underlie some of the risk aversion associated with Burkean
consequentialism.
In short, under many of the potential justifications for gloss,
institutional acquiescence is less central than is commonly assumed. Importantly, however, even if one does not require a
showing of acquiescence, there may be other reasons for insisting on some sort of subjective understanding in addition to looking to patterns of practice. As noted above, looking to such an
understanding may be needed in order to determine the appropriate level of generality at which to describe the practice. In
addition, resort to such an understanding may be needed to distinguish gloss from what Commonwealth theorists call “constitutional conventions,” which are “maxims, beliefs, and principles
that guide officials in how they exercise political discretion.”77
Because both gloss and conventions concern practice-based
norms of governmental conduct, it can be tempting to lump
them together.78 But doing so misses an important difference between them: whereas conventions rest on either a fear of political sanctions or a sense of political morality,79 practice-based
norms that amount to gloss also rest on claims about the content
of constitutional law. Claims about gloss are claims about legal
authority to act and the limits of such authority, and deviations
are considered to be breaches not simply of political norms, but
also of legal obligation. To be sure, appeals to gloss and to conventions sometimes overlap and can be difficult to distinguish,
but this does not mean that they are analytically the same.

77 Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the
United States, 2013 U Ill L Rev 1847, 1860.
78 See, for example, Adrian Vermeule, Conventions in Court, 38 Dublin U L J 283,
284 (2015).
79 See id at 288.
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The need to distinguish gloss from conventions is greater
when courts are applying gloss than when it is invoked by nonjudicial actors. In Congress, for example, those who invoke gloss
can often afford to be vague or imprecise about the boundary between conventions and constitutional law—appealing, for example, to the “spirit” of the Constitution.80 A court attempting to resolve a dispute, however, will need to be more precise about
what falls within and without the domain of binding constitutional law.81 Similarly, executive branch lawyers providing legal
advice may need to distinguish gloss from conventions. Such
lawyers are unlikely to find it sufficient, for example, to lump
together the convention of senatorial courtesy for judicial appointments with, say, gloss-based norms about the constitutional
authority of the president to wage war.
That said, it is important to remember that gloss is not typically invoked as a freestanding source of constitutional law. Instead, as the word “gloss” implies, it is treated as operating with
and upon other modalities of interpretation, such as text, structure, purpose, and consequentialism.82 In part, this is a function
of having a written Constitution and, relatedly, a constitutional
culture that gives primacy to the text when it is perceived to be
clear. This means, among other things, that historical practice is
typically said to be relevant only when the constitutional text is
ambiguous or silent on a question.83 In this respect, gloss is less
80 See Bradley and Siegel, 105 Georgetown L J at 274–80 (cited in note 17) (describing Congress’s mixture of conventional and constitutional objections to President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt’s Court-packing scheme); Tara Leigh Grove, Article III in the Political
Branches, 90 Notre Dame L Rev 1835, 1860 (2015) (“There may [ ] be little reason for
political actors to employ standards that would be deemed workable by the judiciary.”).
81 This distinction between judicial decision-making and political branch reasoning
should not be overstated, however. Courts, too, are sometimes imprecise about the
boundary between constitutional and subconstitutional norms, such as when they construe statutes to avoid “serious constitutional doubts.” See, for example, Jones v United
States, 526 US 227, 239 (1999) (referring to “the rule, repeatedly affirmed, that where a
statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is
to adopt the latter”) (quotation marks omitted).
82 See, for example, Zivotofsky, 135 S Ct at 2091, 2094 (contending that “on balance
[historical practice] provides strong support for the conclusion [based on text, judicial
precedent, and consequentialist considerations] that the recognition power is the President’s alone,” and that this practice “confirms the Court’s conclusion”); Noel Canning,
134 S Ct at 2561, 2570 (contending that historical practice “offers strong support” and
“strongly favors” constructions of the Recess Appointments Clause that the Court otherwise found persuasive based on considerations of purpose and consequentialism).
83 See LaCroix, 126 Harv L Rev F at 81 (cited in note 23) (“[H]istorical practice is
relevant only in situations where the interpreter has first determined that text is unclear
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imperialistic in its claims than some types of constitutional reasoning, such as some variants of textualism and originalism.
Because of the supplementary nature of gloss reasoning,
there is less need for a subjective element for gloss than for
something like customary international law, which is treated as
a freestanding body of binding law.84 Thus, if an interpreter is
inclined for reasons other than gloss to think that an institution
should have a particular type of authority, gloss may be useful
even if it merely shows that the practice can be viewed as consistent with that conclusion. This is one way to understand the
Court’s decision in Zivotofsky: although it was unclear there
whether the long-standing practice of presidential recognition
of foreign governments was based on a shared constitutional
understanding that Congress could not regulate the practice,
the Court was able to cite the practice as at least not contradicting its determination of exclusivity—a determination based
largely on the Court’s views about constitutional structure and
consequences.85
CONCLUSION
To understand how to do gloss, it is important first to understand why one is doing it. As this Essay has explained, there
are a number of possible justifications for doing gloss, and they
have differing methodological implications. In particular, while
or ambiguous.”); Noel Canning, 134 S Ct at 2561, 2568 (insisting that the relevant constitutional provisions were ambiguous). But see Curtis A. Bradley and Neil S. Siegel,
Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 Duke L J 1213, 1262 (2015) (contending that perceptions of textual clarity and ambiguity can themselves be affected by
historical practice and other considerations).
84 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102,
comment j (1987) (“Customary law and law made by international agreement have equal
authority as international law.”). This is one reason for hesitation before drawing on
theoretical work relating to customary international law to inform thinking about gloss.
But see Glennon, 64 BU L Rev at 134 (cited in note 52) (borrowing the concept of opinio
juris from customary international law); Roisman, 84 Geo Wash L Rev at 675 (cited in
note 53) (analogizing gloss to customary international law). See also Vermeule, 38 Dublin
U L J at 288–89 (cited in note 78) (analogizing to customary international law when discussing constitutional conventions).
85 See Zivotofsky, 135 S Ct at 2094 (“This history confirms the Court’s conclusion in
the instant case that the power to recognize or decline to recognize a foreign state and its
territorial bounds resides in the President alone.”); Curtis A. Bradley, Agora: Reflections
on Zivotofsky v. Kerry; Historical Gloss, the Recognition Power, and Judicial Review, 109
Am J Intl L Unbound 2, 6 (2015), archived at http://perma.cc/CMY4-VJZS (“The postnineteenth century practice concerning recognition was dominated by the executive
branch, and this fact helped to reinforce the Court’s finding of exclusivity, even though it
was not by itself sufficient to sustain that conclusion.”).
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justifications grounded in deference generally suggest looking
for evidence of political branch understandings and agreement
about the Constitution’s distribution of authority, justifications
grounded in judicial capacity and Burkean consequentialism
suggest looking primarily for stable patterns of institutional behavior. The implications of the reliance justification are more
difficult to assess, in part because it may turn on contestable notions of when reliance is justified. Disaggregating the justifications in this way helps explain why, for example, courts often
place less emphasis on institutional acquiescence than commonly
recited standards for gloss would tend to suggest. Whatever the
justification, gloss is almost always treated as interconnected
with other constitutional considerations rather than as a fully
independent source of law, a phenomenon that reduces some of
the pressure for methodological precision.

